

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA  
Richmond Division**

**ANTION BOYD,**

Plaintiff,

v.

Civil Action No. **3:12CV411**

**SHANTE BECK,**

Defendant.

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

Antion Boyd, a Virginia inmate proceeding *pro se* and *in forma pauperis*, filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action.<sup>1</sup> The matter is before the Court for evaluation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. Jurisdiction is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 636(b) and 1343.

**Preliminary Review**

Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) this Court must dismiss any action filed by a prisoner if the Court determines the action (1) “is frivolous” or (2) “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); *see* 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. The first standard includes claims based upon ““an indisputably meritless legal theory,”” or claims where the ““factual contentions are clearly baseless.”” *Clay v. Yates*, 809 F. Supp. 417, 427

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<sup>1</sup> The statute provides, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute . . . of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law . . . .

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

(E.D. Va. 1992) (quoting *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989)). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses.” *Republican Party of N.C. v. Martin*, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations are taken as true and the complaint is viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Mylan Labs., Inc. v. Matkari*, 7 F.3d 1130, 1134 (4th Cir. 1993); see also *Martin*, 980 F.2d at 952. This principle applies only to factual allegations, however, and “a court considering a motion to dismiss can choose to begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “require[ ] only ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (second alteration in original) (quoting *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). Plaintiffs cannot satisfy this standard with complaints containing only “labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” *Id.* (citations omitted). Instead, a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level,” *id.* (citation omitted), stating a claim that is “plausible on its face,” *id.* at 570, rather than merely “conceivable.” *Id.* “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

for the misconduct alleged.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing *Bell Atl. Corp.*, 550 U.S. at 556). In order for a claim or complaint to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, therefore, the plaintiff must “allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [his or] her claim.” *Bass v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.*, 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing *Dickson v. Microsoft Corp.*, 309 F.3d 193, 213 (4th Cir. 2002); *Iodice v. United States*, 289 F.3d 270, 281 (4th Cir. 2002)). Lastly, while the Court liberally construes *pro se* complaints, *Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), it does not act as the inmate’s advocate, *sua sponte* developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of his complaint. See *Brock v. Carroll*, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).

### **Summary of Allegations**

Antion Boyd, an inmate previously housed at the Lawrenceville Correctional Center, alleges the following:<sup>2</sup>

On 3-29-12, I was placed in investigative segregation by investigator S. Beck for possible contraband. On 4-17-12, the investigation was completed in which I was put under administrative segregation pending transfer. On 4-27-12, I was given a ICA notice stating that per Investigator Beck I pose a threat to the orderly operation of the institution. Now her reports go to the administration or Warden’s office in which it has been stated that I was involved in illegal activities. Upon this information, I sent an administrative notice to Investigator Beck and her superiors stating exactly why their investigation was meritless, in which Beck never responded or refute my claims.

Now these statement[s], make me a subject of future law enforcement because these statements will be put into my record. By the instant investigation & subsequent transfer, I will be a target on my next facility assignment in which I

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<sup>2</sup> The Court corrects the capitalization and punctuation in quotations from Boyd’s submissions.

will be harassed. This is cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the 8<sup>th</sup> Amendment.<sup>[3]</sup>

There is no proof, evidence, or intelligence to corroborate these claims made on me. If so there would be charges on me or pending. I have been deprived of rights because segregation is a form of punishment in which privileges are taken or limited from me in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1985(3). I have been in this constant state of housing for over 60 days.

(Compl. 5-6 (as paginated by the Court's CM/ECF docketing system).)

### **Analysis**

In order to state a viable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that a person acting under color of state law deprived him or her of a constitutional right or of a right conferred by a law of the United States. *See Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley*, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998). To state out an Eighth Amendment claim, an inmate must allege facts that indicate (1) that objectively the deprivation suffered or harm inflicted “was ‘sufficiently serious,’ and (2) that subjectively the prison officials acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’” *Johnson v. Quinones*, 145 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 1998) (quoting *Wilson v. Seiter*, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). Under the objective prong, the inmate must allege facts that suggest that the deprivation complained of was extreme and amounted to more than the ““routine discomfort”” that is ““part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.”” *Strickler v. Waters*, 989 F.2d 1375, 1380 n.3 (4th Cir. 1993) (quoting *Hudson v. McMillian*, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992)). “In order to demonstrate such an extreme deprivation, a prisoner must allege ‘a serious or significant physical or emotional injury resulting from the challenged conditions.’” *De'Lonta v. Angelone*, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting

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<sup>3</sup> “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII.

*Strickler*, 989 F.2d at 1381). Boyd supplies no factual allegations suggesting the conditions of confinement deprived him of any basic human need or resulted in a physical or emotional injury, much less a significant injury. See *In re Long Term Admin. Segregation of Inmates Designated as Five Percenters*, 174 F.3d 464, 471-72 (4th Cir. 1999). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that Boyd's Eighth Amendment claim be DISMISSED.

Boyd also mentions 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).<sup>4</sup> In order to state a claim under that statute, a complaint must allege facts that support the following elements:

- (1) A conspiracy of two or more persons,
- (2) who are motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus,
- (3) deprive the plaintiff of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all,
- (4) and which results in injury to the plaintiff as
- (5) a consequence of an overt act committed by the defendants in connection with the conspiracy.

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<sup>4</sup> That statute provides, in pertinent part:

If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws; or if two or more persons conspire to prevent by force, intimidation, or threat, any citizen who is lawfully entitled to vote, from giving his support or advocacy in a legal manner, toward or in favor of the election of any lawfully qualified person as an elector for President or Vice President, or as a Member of Congress of the United States; or to injure any citizen in person or property on account of such support or advocacy; in any case of conspiracy set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do, or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators.

42 U.S.C. § 1985(3).


*Buschi v. Kirven*, 775 F.2d 1240, 1257 (4th Cir. 1985) (citations omitted). Boyd fails to allege any facts suggesting a conspiracy of two or more persons motivated by a specific class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus to deprive Boyd of the equal enjoyment of rights secured by the law to all. *Id.* (citations omitted). Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that any claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) and the action be DISMISSED.

If Boyd wishes to file an amended complaint to correct the deficiencies described above, he must submit an amended complaint within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry hereof. *See Williams v. Wilkerson*, 90 F.R.D. 168, 170 (E.D. Va. 1981). Such complaint must set forth legibly, in separately numbered paragraphs, a short statement of the facts giving rise to each claim against each defendant. Boyd must also state what civil rights he believes each defendant violated and explicitly state how said defendant's actions violated each constitutional right. Any amended complaint will supplant the current complaint and all prior submissions. The amended complaint must stand or fall of its own accord.

Boyd is advised that he may file specific written objections to the Report and Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of the date of entry hereof. Such objections should be numbered and identify with specificity the legal or factual deficiencies of the Magistrate Judge's findings. Failure to timely file specific objections to the Report and Recommendation may result in the dismissal of his claims. *See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)*. It may also preclude further review or appeal from such judgment. *See Carr v. Hutto*, 737 F.2d 433, 434 (4th Cir. 1984).

The Clerk is DIRECTED to promptly send a copy of the Report and Recommendation to  
Boyd.

Date: 12/4/13  
Richmond, Virginia

/s/   
M. Hannah Lauck  
United States Magistrate Judge